Traditional justifications for state-to-state development assistance include charity, basic rights, and self-interest. Aside from unusual cases, such as war reparations, development assistance has typically been justified for reasons such as these without reference to a history of injury that holds between the states. We argue that climate change provides a relationship of harm that can be used to supplement and strengthen the traditional claims for development assistance. Finally, to demonstrate the utility of this analysis, we offer a brief application of our reasoning to the emerging conflict in the United Nations over the future post-2015 development agenda.
INTRODUCTION
Traditional justifications for state-to-state development assistance are various and have invoked notions such as 1) charity, 2) beneficence, or 3) basic human rights. They also may invoke claims that 4) wealthy nations are complicit in the poverty of poorer nations (though not always casually responsible); 5) wealthy nations will further their own interests by stabilizing regions that could threaten their security; or 6) the security of the global community is improved by widespread global growth. Whatever the relative strengths and merits of such arguments, a claim that a state A should provide development assistance to a state B would be further strengthened if there were a causal relationship between the states such that A harmed B in the past. Outside of cases such as war reparations, however, causal justifications for development assistance are rare. State-to-state assistance therefore has been motivated by the reasons listed above, unsupplemented by a direct causal element.
We argue that climate change provides a relationship of harm that, while not directly causal, strengthens all of these claims for development assistance. Greenhouse gases produced in wealthy countries historically, and currently, cause global warming which will eventually harm poorer countries less able to adapt to new climatic conditions. This fact is usually cited as a reason why rich countries should cut their emissions more and at a faster rate than poor countries. We will argue that this rationale can also be used to justify greater levels of development assistance, particularly in the form of adaptation assistance, as poor countries are at comparatively greater risk from global warming. The argument for development assistance is therefore given what we will call an "intensifying" element due to the history of global carbon emissions.
Just as in the policy arena, work on the ethics of climate change has tended to focus much more on questions of mitigation rather than adaptation (for a sampling see the essays in Dryzek, Norgaard, and Schlosberg's Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, 2011, which, while comprehensive in scope, contain relatively little on adaptation). Nonetheless, several important collections of essays have recently been published that focus on ethical issues concerning adaptation to climate change primarily through the lens of development ethics (see Adger, et. al., 2006 for an earlier collection, followed, for example, by section four of O'Brien, St. Clair, and Kristoffersen, 2010 , Potthast and Meisch, 2012 , and Becker and Brown, 2013 . 1 While some of these essays focus on particular issues such as agricultural policy (including much of Potthast and Meisch 2012), they primarily tend to examine how one or another common principle in either development or environmental policy can be used to advance the case that rich countries with high historical emissions have an obligation to assist poorer countries with smaller historical emissions. For example, Paul Baer (in Adger, et. al., 2006) articulates an argument for liability for harm to a global commons, Bronwyn Hayward and Karen O'Brien (in O'Brien, St. Clair and, and Kristofferson, 2010) and Des Gasper in (Becker and Brown, 2013) unpack claims on how the idea of human security can be used to justify greater levels of development assistance, and Christian Baatz (in Becker and Brown, 2013) defends a version of a polluter pays principle that can be used to justify similar policies in the face of climate change.
In contrast, rather than offering a defense of a particular argument for why wealthier countries have obligations to help poorer countries adapt to climate change, our analysis is unique in demonstrating how a variety of claims that are already being made for development assistance are strengthened with an appeal to climate change while being agnostic on any particular approach. In this respect, this paper is the first application of methodological environmental pragmatism, as discussed by Andrew Light (2010) , to the literature on climate adaptation. Our purpose here is not to demonstrate the single best moral argument for what we will call "climate-ready development assistance," though we have no reason to believe that cannot be done. Instead, we will argue that the reality of our current climate predicament strengthens traditional arguments for development assistance that have already been embraced by various countries and NGOs. While it is certainly true that climate change strengthens some of these arguments for development assistance more than others, it is also true that climate change pulls all of the justifications for development assistance we will review in the same direction.
Before proceeding, it is important to note two caveats. First, while we will restrict our discussion here to state-to-state development assistance, it will be obvious in some cases (especially in cases of charity and beneficence) that climate change could affect claims for individual obligations by wealthy people to contribute to efforts to relieve suffering in poorer parts of the world. These claims, however, would be complicated by arguments about whether, and to what extent, individuals are causally responsible for climate change. There is a range of views now extant in the literature (see, for example, Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005 and Broome, 2012) . Our analysis need not engage with those arguments, although we will note some connections to these debates.
Second, the very existence of collective responsibility is also a contentious issue, although we will not address it here, insofar as our overall purpose is to demonstrate that commonly accepted arguments for development assistance by many countries are strengthened by climate change, regardless of the foundations of those claims.
Still, with these caveats in mind, the upshot of the present discussion should be a set of arguments that can be used to demonstrate that the countries that already engage in development assistance, for a variety of reasons, should step up their efforts in the face of climate change. If one holds the view that states can have positive collective responsibilities to other states, and that being a historically large emitter of greenhouse gases directly causes harm to individual other states, then our argument below that climate change strengthens claims for development assistance would be even stronger.
We will proceed as follows. First, we will review and unpack the six aforementioned traditional arguments for development assistance. Second, we will show how each of these arguments is strengthened in cases of causal harm between two countries. Third, we will argue that climate change strengthens argument for development assistance in each case even if the harm stemming from global warming is not directly causal between two parties. In the last section of the paper, we briefly demonstrate the practical utility of our argument by applying it to a currently unfolding debate in development policy. The UN Millennium Development Goals, which focus on alleviating and eliminating poverty, are set to expire in 2015 and are currently being considered for reexamination and renewal. At the same time, the final resolution of the Rio+20 conference in 2012 introduced a framework for developing a set of Sustainable Development Goals, which are likely to focus on issues including sustainable agriculture, sustainable energy, disaster risk reduction, and disaster resilience. This raises the question of how the two sets of development goals should be related or indeed whether these two processes should be collapsed into one. We will argue that our analysis is relevant to deciding the structure of the post-2015 development agenda. Aiming our analysis at reconciling the two sets of development goals is consistent with Light's call for a "climate ethics for climate action" (2011), or a climate ethics that aspires to something other than an ideal set of claims about climate ethics or climate justice.
TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR STATE-TO-STATE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
State-to-state development assistance has traditionally been justified by reasons ranging from religiously motivated charity to principled beneficence to self-interest. Below are some examples of these justifications, starting in each case with exemplary language on how they can be stated. Charity (or "weak" beneficence). All other things being equal, a state party should help another less well off party if possible, when it has the capacity to do so.
Justifications for charity are given in moral as well as religious terms, sometimes requiring that a certain threshold be met and sometimes only advising voluntary contributions. One example, often cited in the literature on charitable giving by countries in the Muslim world such as Saudi Arabia, are the notions of "zakat" and "sadaqa," where sadaqa is a voluntary, non-fixed amount of charitable giving, and zakat is an obligatory and continuous obligation to donate 2.5 percent of one's income annually to charity.
Underlying religious and cultural norms influence how states and citizens give charitably. The principle of charitable giving is firmly enshrined in Islam, which emphasizes humanitarianism in various forms such as zakat and sadaqa. Zakat is one of the religion's Five Pillars and a requirement for all believers. Sadaqa means "to give away and realize one's faith by action" and is strongly encouraged by the Prophet Muhammad's sayings such as "charity is due upon a person on every day that the sun rises" (Kroessin, 2007) .
Strong beneficence.
A state party is obligated, where feasible, to prevent bad things from happening, offer assistance to struggling societies, or respond to humanitarian disasters, if it is in its power to do so without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance.
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When subjected to the test of impartial assessment, there are few strong grounds for giving preference to the interests of one's fellow citizens, and none that can override the obligations that arises whenever we can, at little cost to ourselves, make an absolutely crucial difference to the well-being of another person in real need. Hence the issue of foreign aid is a matter with which citizens of any country of the developed world ought to be concerned. Citizens of the United States should feel particularly troubled about their country's contribution. [. . .] America's failure to pull its weight in the fight against [global] poverty is, therefore, due not only to the ignorance of the American public but also to the moral deficiencies of its political leaders (Singer, 2002: 180, 185 ).
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Basic rights. All people have a right to life (or some aspect of flourishing), and state parties should help to promote that right if they can without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance.
We also reaffirm the importance of freedom, peace and security, respect for all human rights, including the right to development and the right to an adequate standard of living, including the right to food, the rule of law, gender equality and women's empowerment and the overall commitment to just and democratic societies for development (UN General Assembly, 2012: §8).
Complicity. The economies of wealthy nations were built (or are being built) partly through the exploitation of poorer countries. In general, wealthier countries have an obligation to make up for that exploitation and the poverty that it engenders even when the benefits derived from exploitation were shared with other parties.
It is very difficult to clearly find the reasons why the developed countries continue to give out their citizens' tax money as aid to poor countries when a number of their (the developed countries) own citizens remain homeless and poor. But one of the reasons that are often cited is that the developed countries -who are now known in the parlance of African leaders as development partners -have a commitment to helping ensure a better world for all. Others think that international aid is just a way of compensating Africa for the Slavery, Colonialism and all the exploitative practices perpetrated by the developed world and which Africa had had to endure for centuries (Braimah, 2009 ).
Self-interest.
In providing development assistance to poor countries, wealthy nations will further their own interests by stabilizing regions of the world where conflict exacerbated by poverty could cause problems that threaten the security of wealthy countries, or by otherwise expanding their sphere of influence.
It can, of course, be argued that the more rapid development of Africa's resources will bring social and economic advantages to the native peoples in addition to buttressing the political and economic influence of the United Kingdom (Norman Brooke, Secretary to the British Labour cabinet, 1948, quoted in Hinds, 2001: 136) .
Globalization. The world is now an interconnected place where borders matter less than they once did in human history. The overall safety and security of the global community is improved by widespread global growth which can be accelerated through development assistance.
In an interdependent and interconnected world, each member of the international community has stakes in common security, prosperity and welfare. The eradication of poverty and hunger in least developed countries, among others, would contribute towards ensuring global stability and prosperity in a sustainable manner (UN Conference on Least Developed Countries, 2011: §III, 29e).
In the next section we demonstrate how each of these claims is strengthened by a relationship of causal harm between two countries.
CLAIMS FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE STRENGTHENED BY A CAUSAL

RELATIONSHIP OF HARM
It should be uncontroversial that the claim that a state A should provide development assistance to a state B is strengthened if A directly harmed B in the past, such as in a case of war reparations. For example, the war reparations agreements signed between West Germany and Israel after World War II on September 10, 1952, were predicated in part on the Nazi use of Jews as slave labor during the war and their persecution during the Holocaust. This causal chain of harm provided a comparatively stronger basis for a claim for development assistance from West Germany, as opposed to other countries, at a time when the Israeli economy had been devastated following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. 4 Citing a causal relationship of harm may shore up the claim for assistance by 1) strengthening the original justification (as in the cases of charity, beneficence, basic rights, and complicity); 2) adding a moral dimension to the call for assistance that did not previously exist (as in the case of self-interest), or 3) focusing the call for assistance to a particular region (as in the case of globalization).
Below we offer some examples, though not an exhaustive account, of how the traditional justifications for development assistance iterated above are strengthened by a causal relationship of harm between two parties. In most cases, the claim of direct, causal harm also overcomes intrinsic shortcomings to the basic claim for development assistance. As we will show below, understanding how a causal relationship of harm between two parties strengthens the claim for assistance will in turn support our core claim that climate change strengthens a variety of rationales for development assistance. Clearly, each of these explanations deserves a fuller defense, but they should suffice here to make our present case for climate-ready development assistance. (For an exhaustive account of examples involving reparations see De Greiff, 2008;  for a discussion of some complications in the climate literature see Caney, 2006.) Charity. If country A has harmed country B, then assistance is no longer sufficiently captured by a claim to meet a minimum threshold of charitable contributions, or an admonition to voluntarily contribute to those in need, but is a requirement to make up for a past harm. The justification of charity is transformed into a positive obligation to help those who are less well off because of causal complicity in making them less well off. It may very well be the case that such an obligation should no longer count as "charity," given the voluntary implications of this term.
Strong Beneficence. If A has harmed B, then beneficence is strengthened such that a sacrifice of something of greater moral importance to fulfill the duty may be justified because one has imposed a concomitant sacrifice on others.
Basic Rights. If A has harmed B such that A has caused the citizens of B to lack basic rights, then assistance becomes obligatory. Because a right to X outweighs mere preferences for competing goods, sacrifice of something of comparable moral importance by A in order to deliver assistance to B is justified.
Complicity. The claim that the wealth of rich nations is built on the backs of poorer nations is often in dispute and suffers from tenuous arguments about systemic causes or instances of over-determination. If A has forcibly taken resources from B, or actively harmed its development, then the arguments for general complicity are replaced by a straightforward account of harm.
Self-interest.
If A has harmed B in the past, then A should not limit itself to citing a selfinterested reason to provide development assistance to B. The claim for assistance is strengthened in this case because it is given an other-regarding moral justification. Nonetheless, there is no intrinsic reason why self-interest needs to be completely abandoned in such a case.
Globalization. An interest in spreading global growth doesn't necessarily lead to development assistance flowing to any part of the world in particular. If A has harmed B, then it will have a special obligation to assist B, even if this obligation is augmented by an interest in promoting globalization overall.
In the next section, we take the view that climate change strengthens the traditional justifications for state-to-state development assistance. This will however be weaker than a war reparations claim, but stronger than the traditional justifications offered for development assistance alone. It is weaker insofar as demonstrating a direct causal connection of harm through greenhouse gas emissions between two countries, or one wealthy high-emitting country and a cluster of poor low-emitting countries, is much more difficult to demonstrate than a documented armed conflict between two parties. Greenhouse gas emissions anywhere in the world add to a common global phenomenon that will most likely make poor, vulnerable countries poorer and more vulnerable. Unlike point source pollution, communities directly downstream from the source of carbon dioxide emissions are not any more uniquely vulnerable to the warming effects of another party's greenhouse gas emissions than any other party. Though some have tried to calculate the overall aggregate harm of global warming at the level of individuals (see Broome, 2012) , such claims are certainly more contentious than claims of direct causal harm in a war reparations scenario. Also missing, at least up until the early 1990s when most parties to the UN signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was a clear basis for the claim that leaders or most citizens of historically high greenhouse gas emitting countries knew (or at least recognized) the potential harm that they were causing. In this respect there is arguably very little by way of a compelling case for intentional harm on the part of richer countries against poorer countries. In contrast, the intentionality of acts of aggression in cases that justify war reparations strengthens the argument for responsibility of aggressor nations. (This is certainly true in the case of the West Germany-Israel reparations agreement.) Nonetheless, climate change still strengthens traditional justifications for state-to-state development assistance. Even if a direct causal harm similar to the war reparations scenario is not at hand, the totality of a country's emissions still matters in an assessment of responsibility for the harm brought about by climate change. This point is already well recognized in the literature on international agreements on greenhouse gas mitigation: those who pollute more (either historically or on a per capita basis) should reduce their emissions more and at a faster rate than those who have polluted less as part of an overall just distribution of global emission reductions.
6 While this argument is often used to justify the likely economic hardships involved in a transition away from cheap sources of fossil fuel based energy (i.e., those who have polluted the most in the past -and benefited from that pollution -should take the first economic hit in giving up dirty fuel sources), the reasoning behind it should also apply toward assessing responsibility for harm caused by those same emissions. This is indeed the general reasoning behind the "Loss and Damage" discussion introduced into the UN climate negotiations at the 2007 meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Bali, Indonesia, which raised the question of whether and how to compensate poor and vulnerable countries for, among other things, damage caused by climate-related extreme weather events. So far, however, the debate over creation of some kind of international Loss and Damage program is much more narrow than our present discussion. Our question is whether wealthier countries have a general obligation to assist poorer countries for overall development in the face of the multiple changes brought about by a warmer world (which, as we will see below, can also include assistance for mitigation as well as adaptation), while the core topic of Loss and Damage is the more particular question of whether wealthier countries are liable for physical damage caused by particular climate related events after that damage has occurred. For example, current options for operationalizing a principle around Loss and Damage focus more on creation of an international mechanism such as a climate risk insurance facility. While we would hope that our analysis could inform this debate, at present it is unfortunately getting held up over exactly the issue we want to avoid: the extent to which high-emitting parties can be determined to be directly causally responsible for harms caused by its emissions. As a result, advance on a meaningful program to address Loss and Damage is running into an even more basic question of whether any particular extreme weather event can be attributed to climate change at all (for a discussion of some of the issues emerging out of the 2012 UN climate summit in Doha, see Stabinsky, 2013) .
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In contrast, we take the position that even though it may not be demonstrable that a country like the United States is directly causing harm to some particular developing country that is vulnerable to climate change, it matters that the U.S. is currently the largest historical greenhouse gas emitter and the largest per capita emitter, and those cumulative emissions are a significant driver on a global phenomenon that will harm the poorest and most vulnerable countries first.
The United States' emissions are a relative "intensifier" of harm to poorer countries overall relative to other parties around the world with lower emissions. Whatever impacts are eventually felt because of increased emissions anywhere in the world become more probable as emissions go up. Greenhouse gas emissions from the top emitting countries (both historically and today) increase those risks.
Below we will demonstrate how this kind of harm manifests itself in a way that is relevant to claims for development assistance. One next obvious question though, is how much a country's emissions would increase its obligations to help those countries suffering from climate-related impacts. This would be an exceptionally difficult question to answer, though our argument here can set it aside for now as we are assuming that a given country has already agreed to offer development assistance to another country for one of the six aforementioned reasons. In that respect, our argument is more restrictive. So long as we can demonstrate that climate change causes harm to poor, vulnerable countries, then rich, high-emitting countries who have already committed to development assistance will see those reasons strengthened by their emissions profile.
CLIMATE CHANGE AS AN INTENSIFIER OF CLAIMS FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
Greenhouse gases produced in wealthy countries have caused more atmospheric forcing of global warming than those produced in poor countries. This is because wealthy countries historically have been the largest emitters of carbon dioxide, which is a long-lived greenhouse gas. Half of CO 2 persists in the atmosphere for up to a hundred years, while approximately 20% lasts for thousands or tens of thousands of years. The approximately 1 degree Celsius of anthropogenic global warming caused to date is from the cumulative emissions which began to increase significantly with the industrial revolution (Hansen, et. al. 2008 ).
But even with a possible rapid decrease in emissions by these parties, accumulated CO 2 in the atmosphere will continue to cause debilitating and dramatic impacts. And, as is well appreciated, the situation is quickly changing, with rapidly developing countries increasing their emissions at a faster rate than developed countries. China, for example, is now the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter and, at current rates of growth, will most likely become the world's largest historical emitter as early as 2030 (see Blanford, Richels, and Rutherford, 2008) .
These emissions, no matter the source, will affect capacity to deliver on traditionally accepted development goals, such as the promotion of global public health. If a party has already agreed to contribute to measures to improve global public health for some reason (as the U.S. did under the Bush administration), those reasons are strengthened by climate change.
The harm that global warming is inflicting on public health in poorer countries is well documented. Climate change is already exacerbating tropical diseases, and, through impacts on agriculture, other facets of human health, which will only worsen in the future. Here are several examples:
• It is estimated that already in 2000, climate change caused over 150,000 deaths and five million DALYs (disability-adjusted life years) due to malnutrition, diarrhea, and malaria. The incidences were primarily in developing countries (McMichael et al., 2004 ).
• It is estimated that in 2050 in sub-Saharan Africa, climate change could cause an additional 85,000-100,000 deaths due to malaria and dengue (Hayashi et al., 2010 ).
• Hales et al. (2002) estimate that 5-6 billion people will be at risk of dengue, compared to 3-5 billion people in the absence of climate change, in 2085.
• Climate change is estimated to cause an increase in severe stunting in 2050 of 23% (in sub-Saharan Africa) to 62% (in South Asia) (Lloyd et al., 2011) .
Many more examples could be given on any number of impacts of climate change that will impede traditional goals for development assistance, especially in countries where historical levels of poverty have already made their populations vulnerable. These include food availability, access to clean drinking water, impact on forest products, vulnerability of coastal communities, and impacts on infrastructure. An exhaustive account can be found in the report of Working Group Two of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Fourth Assessment Report (Parry, et. al. 2007 ).
Our contention is that this evidence, though not directly causal, strengthens the traditional reasons for state-to-state development assistance. Below we again express the traditional justifications for development assistance with explanations of how they should be supplemented by an appeal to climate change. Let A and B be countries such that B is more vulnerable to climate change than A and has contributed relatively less to anthropogenic climatic forcing than
A.
Charity. Charity dictates that A should, if it can, provide development assistance to B, whose citizens are less well off than its own. With an appeal to climate change, an admonition to engage in voluntary acts of charity should be transformed at least into a requirement to meet a minimum threshold, such that A provides development assistance to B in order to help make up for B's vulnerability.
Strong Beneficence. As A is partly though not exclusively responsible for B's vulnerability caused by climate change, a sacrifice of something of comparable moral importance by A in order to assist B may be justified.
Basic Rights. If the basic human rights of B's citizens are threatened by climate change, then it is necessary for A to provide assistance, and a sacrifice of something of comparable moral importance by A may be justified.
Complicity. The claim that the wealth of rich nations is built on the backs of poorer nations is often in dispute and suffers from tenuous arguments about systemic causes. If B, however, is more vulnerable to climate change than A, and has contributed relatively less to anthropogenic climatic forcing than A, then the arguments for general complicity are strengthened by a diffused account of harm.
Self-interest.
As A is partly responsible for B's vulnerability, A should not limit itself to citing a self-interested reason to provide development assistance to B. However, in the case of climate change even the self-interested motive is strengthened, as whatever interest A has in the stability of B is strengthened relative to the increasing instability B will suffer without adequate adaptation measures as a result of future climate change.
Globalization. An interest in spreading global growth doesn't necessarily lead to development assistance flowing to any part of the world in particular. Climate change will make some parts of the world more vulnerable than others based on a combination of geographical, economic, and social factors. An interest in global growth should be targeted to first help the most vulnerable adapt to climate change since their failure to adapt may have cascading effects on other countries to which they are economically linked.
Regardless of which justification is cited, an appeal to the harm caused by climate change strengthens the claim for development assistance, which now also takes the form of adaptation assistance, as climate change is the driver that strengthens the claim for state-to-state aid.
Responding to issues such as the public health problems cited above is not simply an act of development assistance but also a form of adaptation to a warming world. Climate change transforms traditional development assistance into climate-ready development assistance. Of course, there will be other forms of assistance for climate adaptation that will not extend from traditional development assistance. However, we will show below how this same argument could be applied in some circumstances to help support mitigation efforts in developing countries as well.
AN APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POST-2015
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
The utility and strength of this analysis so far can fairly be called into question given the limitations that we have placed upon it. We have not tried to provide foundational reasons why a given country is required to contribute to bilateral or multilateral adaptation funds because of its current or historical emissions. Instead, we have argued that the reasons that a country has already accepted for providing development assistance are strengthened by its overall contribution to global warming.
Our argument, however, could nonetheless help to resolve substantive policy issues. An example is the currently unfolding problem of reconciling 1) the process of renewing or extending the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with 2) the new effort to create a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
The These two sets of goals could potentially be in conflict. For example, an SDG, or set of SDGs, on energy should call for an increase in renewable or zero-carbon energy, given the role of fossil fuels in driving climate change. But one can imagine the creation of an MDG on improving access to electricity for the poor that was agnostic about the source of that power. This is a significant problem, as there are currently over 1.2 billion people without access to electricity, most of them in Africa and Asia. Lifting them out of energy poverty with fossil fuels in order to meet an MDG on energy access would thwart an attempt to protect them from the dangerous impacts of climate change, as it would significantly add to the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (see, for example, Griggs, et. al. 2013 , Sachs 2012 . While it may seem obvious that problems like these should be avoided, there are still disagreements in the development and environmental communities on the necessity of making their two agendas cohere.
To put the possible outcomes of these two processes into perspective, we consider two possible relationships between the MDGs and the SDGs, which we will call (a) inclusion and (b)
independence. SDGs and any revised MDGs would be "twin tracks," and we would work to achieve them in parallel.
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Significantly different views on how or whether to interrelate the MDGs and SDGs have now emerged. The Scenario of Inclusion, specifically the structure of (i), corresponds with the vision of Ban Ki-moon, who says that the new sustainable development goals should "build on the MDGs" (Ban, 2012) and "pick up where the MDGs leave off" (Ban, 2011) . The structure in (i) also has been endorsed by Jeffrey Sachs, who thinks of the SDGs as an umbrella agenda that includes subsets of social, economic, and environmental goals (Sachs, 2012) . It has been noted elsewhere, however, that a structure that subsumes the MDGs within the SDGs could risk diluting the focus on poverty eradication (Evans and Steven, 2012) and could appear to have an "environmental bias" that would be opposed by many developing countries.
While the Scenario of Independence would be the most politically expedient, since it would allow all parties that favor the integrity of MDGs or potential SDGs to get what they wish, it is doubtful that it would result in a workable and consistent global framework. Moreover, it is doubtful that it would be adopted, given the recent history of international negotiations: the outcome document from Rio+20 and the original SDG proposal call for integrated frameworks between the two kinds of goals. In addition, it has been argued that social and economic issues must be pursued within a framework of sustainable development in order to appreciate the interconnections between social progress, poverty eradication, and vulnerability brought about by climate change and other environmental problems.
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But the argument that climate change can serve as an intensifier of justifications for development assistance provides another reason not to adopt the Scenario of Inclusion. By keeping the impacts of global warming in the same framework as poverty and social issues, we strengthen our reasons to act on development issues and are motivated to prioritize double wins on climate and poverty. With the Scenario of Independence, we have less motivation to combine priorities and could instead create competing priorities. Again, consider the issue of energy poverty. This should be considered not only as a problem but also as an opportunity for such a double win on climate and poverty.
It is an accepted convention of international climate diplomacy that it would be perverse to make developing countries more vulnerable to climate change by asking them to lower their
GDPs through an expensive shift to low-carbon or zero-carbon technologies. From our foregoing account, it should be similarly clear that it would be perverse to make developing countries more vulnerable to climate change by encouraging them to meet their development needs through carbon intensive growth. In this respect, what Henry Shue (1993) once justified as "subsistence emissions," or, the emissions of the poor to meet basic needs, should not be encouraged, because they make poor countries even more vulnerable to climate change, which could undermine any development benefits they accrue through carbon intensive growth. But if the global poor are not entitled to subsistence emissions, then they must get their power from sources other than fossil fuels. So, if we have positive obligations to make up for the harm of climate change in developing countries through adaptation assistance, then we also have an obligation to help them not to exacerbate their own climate vulnerability by aiding them in creating reliable low-carbon or zero-carbon systems of energy.
An example of a program that epitomizes this thinking is Ban Ki-moon's Sustainable threat. This analysis has not settled the critical issue of how much high-emitting countries should increase their assistance, or the proper distribution of assistance to poorer countries by richer countries. Resolution of these questions of distributive justice should however take into account the line of reasoning we have presented here.
7 One could take the position that a more systemic, and possibly more effective approach to creation of a Loss and Damage program would be to increase development assistance to poorer countries to the point where they will be better able to withstand extreme weather events and other impacts of climate change simply by virtue of being more prepared. It is highly unlikely though that this discussion will move in that direction since there would then be little or no distinction between a Loss and Damage program and a general program of provision of finance for climate adaptation. This would put a Loss and Damage program in conflict with the mandate of the Green Climate Fund.
